It is an understatement to say that the Statisti-USDA production reports are a major cause of cal Reporting Service is not the farmers' and short-run resource misallocation in agriculture. ranchers' most popular USDA agency. Many agFollowing this line of reasoning, some producricultural producers are quick to express their ers suggest that the way to "beat the system" is concerns that SRS production reports have a to report false production plans on USDA pronegative impact on farm prices and farm inducer surveys. Producers often express the opincomes. There appears to be a widespread feeling ion that reports of high levels of production deamong producers that release of information press prices. Thus, they reason that if producers about their current and planned production levels under-report production plans, the USDA report results in a transfer of wealth from producers to will underestimate production, and prices will be other groups.
higher than if producers had accurately reported Opinions of North and South Dakota farmers production. Is that true? Under what conditions, and ranchers revealed in a 1978 survey are probif any, does the release of production estimates ably quite similar to those of agricultural producand producers' production intentions work to the ers in other parts of the U.S. Seventy-eight perdetriment of producers? Is it in producers' intercent of the Dakota respondents expressed the est falsely to report current and/or planned proopinion that other groups benefited more from duction levels? If so, is it in their interest to in-SRS reports than did agricultural producers.
flate or deflate actual production numbers? Non-producer groups most frequently named as This paper answers that set of questions and benefiting from this information were grain and demonstrates that the three misconceptions menlivestock buyers, food processors, and spectioned above are indeed invalid. ulators. Futhermore, the respondents expressed considerable skepticism about the accuracy of Conceptual Framework USDA information. "Only about one-fourth felt that government reports could be trusted almost Throughout this paper, we are dealing with a always or most of the time. About one in five said production adjustment situation in which there he could 'hardly ever' trust government data. In are no carry-over stocks. Producers use imperaddition, two-to-one majorities felt that private fect information to formulate a price expectation commercial services were more accurate than for the coming period P*. Based on P*, producgovernment surveys, and that operators did not ers commit the productive resources necessary give accurate information when they did particito achieve the planned level of output Qp, correpate. Furthermore, most Dakota operators exsponding to P* on the producer supply (planning) pressed the belief that publication of government curve SS that exists at the time the production reports depresses prices they receive . . (Jones process is initiated (Figure 1 ). Sometime after the et al., pp. xvii)." initiation of the process, but prior to harvest The opinions expressed in the Dakota survey time, the USDA releases an estimate of the contain three common misconceptions about forthcoming level of production Q (Q is the SRS reports. (1) USDA production forecasts USDA estimate of Qp). Using this information must be perfectly accurate to be of value to proand, perhaps also, private production forecasts, ducers, and inaccurate forecasts generate welproducers then formulate a new price expectafare transfers from agricultural producers to tionP, with the assistance of professional market other groups of society. (2) If USDA reports on analysts and the futures market. For simplicity, the size of the current crop were not released, we will assume that the market demand curve in prices would somehow be higher than is the case the coming period DD is known with certainty at when the reports are released. Figure 1 illustrates the situation in which P* > D Pe, and no USDA reports are released. In the --(Q-QUANTITY absence of additional information about the amount of production in process, output Qp FIGURE 1. Impact of P* > Pe without USDA would be placed on the market at harvest, Production Forecast generating a price Po, and resulting in a shortfall of income relative to cost on all output greater than Qo represented by the shaded area in Figure  1 . production forecasts Q must be evaluated on the forecast error associated with not knowing DD frecast. error assoiated with not knoing D basis of whether the existence of these reports with certainty. This assumption alters only the expands or reduces the shaded area in Figure 1 . magnitude of adjustments that are made in response to the USDA forecasts. It does not alter B P the nature or validity of the conclusions drawn in this paper.I this paper. ' .The impacts of an accurate USDA forecast are Producers alter plans on the basis of their rete in F e 2 e accrat re vised price expectations . However since the illustrated in Figure 2 . The accurate USDA forevised price expectations P. However, since the cast of production generates a revised price excast of production generates a revised price exproduction process is already ongoing, produca c r r , ^. ".,. 1 •^pectation of P and causes production to be reers' adjustment is limited to points along the supc Q rduction posbe duced to QL (the maximum reduction possible ply adjustment curve aa. The length and slope of t c tae he reli prii under the circumstances). The realized price is aa depends on the product being produced an which would hve octhen Pt, rather than Po, which would have octhe point during the production process at which r TT1 *^^
in the absence of a USDA report. Thus, in the USDA report is released (Bullock, 1976, this case, the release of an accurate USDA fore-I^ ^ "^ " ^^^^ ^^^^-^J^ this case, the release of an accurate USDA fore-1981). Producers then adjust output to Qr at harvest time, generating a realized price Pr. We are not concerned here with how P* is formed. It may be nothing more than last pe-PRICE D riod's price, or it may be the product of a sophisticated expectations model. However, since P* is \ formed without perfect knowledge, it is unlikely that P* will be equal to Pe, the equilibrium price p* that would exist, if producers had perfect infor-/ mation about supply and demand in the coming period. We will consider three situations (P* > PE Pe), (P* < Pe), and (P* = Pe). For each of these situations, we will examine the following condip.
tions with respect to USDA production fore-= p 0 casts: A, no USDA forecasts are released; B, a perfectly accurate USDA forcast is released (i.e., \ Q = Qp); C, the USDA underestimates planned D production (i.e., Q < Qp); D, the USDA overesoE QL Q = Qp QUANTITY timates planned production (i.e., Q > Qp). For purposes of discussion, we will assume that con-FIGURE 2. Impact of Perfectly Accurate dition C occurs because responding producers USDA Production Forecast when P* > Pe deliberately under-report production; and that ' Thabet has generalized the model to account for possible errors in estimating aa, as well as production forecast errors. His results confirm the statement made here. cast increases producer incomes by the amount Qf < W,, realized output will be between QL and of the shaded area in Figure 2 , relative to what Qp, and producer income will be improved by would have occurred in the absence of the USDA some fraction of the shaded area in Figure 3 .
report. Clearly, the release of an accurate USDA However, if Qf < W 2 , the revised price forecast report is in the interest of producers, as conwill be greater than P*, and producers would be trasted with the situation in which no USDA reenticed expand rather than reduce output. The port is released.
result would be a reduction in producer net income, compared to the situation in which there C. USDA Underestimates Production (Q < Qp) was no USDA report. Thus, in situations where Qp > Qe, it is never in the producer's interest to Should responding producers decide that it is falsify production reports in an effort to cause the in their interest to bias the USDA report down-USDA report to underestimate Qp. ward by under-reporting production, the result would be Q < Qp (Figure 3 ). Because only re-D. USDA Overestimates Production (Q > Qp) sponding producers are aware of the report bias, the USDA report generates a new expected price Figure 4 depicts the situation in which produc-P and results in output being reduced to QL (again ers falsely over-report production plans, resultthe maximum reduction possible under the ciring in a USDA forecast Q > Qp. The impacts of cumstances). The realized price is P, rather than this forecast are the same as with an accurate Po, which would have occurred in the absence of forecast. Output will be reduced to QL and prothe USDA report. Thus, even though the USDA ducer net revenues will be increased by the report underestimated planned production, the shaded area in Figure 4 . Given that Qp > Qe, this impact on producer income is the same as in the conclusion holds, regardless of how large the preceding situation in which the USDA report over-forecast error is.
was perfectly accurate. Producer incomes are Implications. In situations where Qp > Qe, enhanced by the shaded area in Figure 3 , even producers clearly benefit, from the existence of though the USDA report was inaccurate.
the USDA report. Moreover, the forecast does Moreover, the false reports submitted by pronot have to be accurate in order to generate beneducers did not enhance their income position relfits to producers. Any forecast Qf > W 2 causes ative to accurate USDA reports. output to be reduced from the Qp level and thus Actually, in those situations where Qp > Qe, it enhances producer net income relative to the is impossible for producers to under-report prono-report situation. Furthermore, there is no induction and enhance their net income position centive for producers to report false production, relative to a perfectly accurate USDA forecast.
because the impact of the report on their income However, it is possible for producers to harm is not affected by the magnitude of the forecast themselves by causing the USDA report grossly error (Q -Qp) for all forecasts Qf > W 2 . Based on to underestimate production. Note in Figure 3 historical evidence, it is highly unlikely that a that, for any forecast Qf -W 1 output will be forecast error greater than (Q -W 2 ) will occur reduced to QL, and producer net income will be (Mlay and Tweeten; Houck and Pearson; enhanced by the shaded area. For forecasts W 2 < Gorham). Moreover, if an error of this magnitude
. Impact of a USDA Underforecast FIGURE 4. Impact of USDA Overforecast when P* > e when P* > Pe did occur, it would likely be immediately obvito be expanded to Qu, resulting in a realized price ous, judging from other available information, Pr (Figure 6 ). Producer net returns are enhanced that a serious forecasting error had been encounby the shaded area in Figure 6 , relative to the tered, and the report would be viewed with consituation where no USDA report is released. siderable skepticism.
However, since Pr < Po, there is also a reduction in producer net returns, represented by the II. P* LESS THAN Pe hatched area of Figure 6 . Thus, in this case, the net impact of the USDA production forecast on A. No USDA Forecast producer returns depends on the relative magnitude of the shaded area and the hatched area. If Now consider the situation in which P* < Pe the demand curve for the product is inelastic at and hence Qp < Pe. In this case, producers are output Qp, then the hatched area will exceed the gearing up to produce less than the market equishaded area, and net returns will be reduced by librium quantity as illustrated in Figure 5 . In the the release of the accurate USDA report. Howabsence of additional information, the output will ever, if demand is elastic, then net income of the be Qp, and the realized price will be Po. The quesindustry would be expanded by the release of the tion is: Given that QP < Qe, how will the release of USDA report. USDA production forecasts alter producer income relative to the situation in which no USDA C. USDA Underestimate of Production (Q < Q) report is released?
Since the market price would exceed marginal Suppose that responding producers deliberproduction costs at all levels of output between ately under-report production and thus cause the Qp and Qe, portions of the shaded area in Figure 5 USDA forecast to underestimate planned prorepresent potential increases in producer net induction. As illustrated in Figure 7 , the USDA come, if output is expanded beyond Qp. Howunderestimate of production Q generates a reever, at output levels greater than Qp, the vised price expectation of P, causing output to be realized price would be less than Po, and reveexpanded to Qu and price at harvest time to be nues on the Qp units of production would be rePr. Thus, the impact on producer net income duced accordingly. Thus, the impact on producer would be the same as for the perfectly accurate income of altering output from the Qp level in forecast that is indicated by the shaded and response to USDA production reports depends hatched areas in Figure 7 . The same conclusion on the elasticity of demand, and the capacity of holds for any under-forecast Qf < Qp. Thus, if producers to respond to the information provided demand for the product is inelastic, it is not in by the USDA reports.
producers' interests purposely to under-report production. B. Perfectly Accurate USDA Forecast (4 = Q,) D. USDA Overestimate of Production (Q > Qp) If the USDA forecast correctly identifies Q = Qp as the level of planned production, then the Figure 8 illustrates that an over-forecast will revised price expectation of P will cause output generate revised price expectations of P and re-
FIGURE 5. Impact of P* < Pe without USDA FIGURE 6. Impact of Perfectly Accurate ForeProduction Forecast cast when P* < Pe 7 . Impact of USDA Underforecast that producers as a group exercise supply rewhen P* < Pe straint to take advantage of the inelastic demand. Assuming away the problem is hardly justification for arguing that the USDA production foresult in output being expanded to Qu. Thus, the casts should not be released. Historical data on impacts of USDA overestimates of planned output, prices, and farm income strongly suggest production (i.e., Q > Qp), when P* < Pe are the that Qp is seldom less than Qe. Moreover, in same as when Q = Qp or Q < Qp, provided the those cases where Qp has been less than Qe, it over-forecast is greater than Qp but less than Z,.
was not recognized prior to the release of the For forecast Z 1 < Qf < Z2, the output adjustment USDA production forecasts. will be somewhere between QL and Qu, and the change in producer new revenue will be some III. P* EQUALS Pe fraction of the areas shown in Figure 8 . If Q = Z2, then there would be no change in output, because A. No USDA Forecast P = P*, and the result of this forecast would be the same as if no forecast had been released. If Q If producers were always able accurately to > Z 2 , then output would be reduced along aa, anticipate market conditions, so that P* = Pe, we and the shaded area of Figure 8 (foregone net would expect the equilibrium level of output to revenues) would be expanded, rather than rebe produced each period. In this case, if no duced. However, the hatched area would also be USDA report is released, production would reexpanded rather than be reduced. Thus, if Qp < main at Qp =Qe. Thus, there would be no need Qe and demand is inelastic, it is in producer for USDA reports to provide information about interest for the USDA report grossly to overesforthcoming levels of production if P* = Pe. timate production, so that output is further reMoreover, a perfectly accurate USDA estimate of Qp would have no impact on output or prices-and would thus have no value. However, if P* = Pe, any forecast error would directly PRICE impact producer incomes. Therefore, if P* al-\D s ways equals Pe, we should terminate SRS forecasting activities.
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B. USDA Underestimate of Production (Q < Qp)
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A .Suppose that the USDA forecast underestimates planned output (i.e., Q < Qp = Qe), because responding producers deliberately underreported production, thinking that this action would raise prices. The output projection would S a ' \D cause price expectations to change to P and out-_____ _____ ______ put to expand to Qu (Figure 9 ). Thus, producers
would incur a reduction in net income as indicated by the hatched area in Figure 9 . Therefore, FIGURE 8. Impact of USDA Overforecast if P* = Pe, it is not in producers' interests to when P* < Pe under-report production and, hence, cause realized output to be less than Qp.
PRICE over-reporting strategy to be appropriate, pro-D~~~~\ ~ducers must know a priori that P* = P. s Moreover, the producers reporting as part of the USDA survey must know how much they can P _ \^ a / collectively over-report production, so that Q > Qp and still remains a credible report, so that the 1* P P\~ d /producers that were not included in the USDA USDA production forecasts reduces producer FIGURE 9. Impact of USDA Underforecas net income only if planned production is less than when P* = Pe market equilibrium (i.e., Qp < Qe), and the demand for the product is inelastic. In this case, release of the report will lead to expanded pro-C. USDA Overestimate of Production (Q > Q,) duction and a reduction of producer incomes. In all other cases, producer net income either is enIf producers over-report production and cause hanced or does not change relative to the situa-Q to be greater than Q, as illustrated in Figure 10 , tion where no USDA reports are released. the release of the USDA report will cause output Second, the contribution of USDA production to be reduced to QL. Consequently, producer net forecasts to producer income is not a monotonic income will be increased by the shaded area and function of the size of the forecast error. decreased by the hatched area in Figure 10 , relaMoreover, the value of the forecast is indepentive to the situation in which no USDA report is dent of the magnitude of the forecast error over a released.
wide range of errors. Third, when producers purposely reduce outImplications. If P* = Pe and demand is inelasput below market clearing levels to take advantic, it is in producers' interest for the USDA retage of an inelastic demand, producers have port to be biased upward, causing a reduction in nothing to g ( couldinn some cases lose) by output and an increase in net returns. Thus, in falsely reporting current or planned production this situation it is in producers' interests for reon USDA surveys. Furthermore, in this special sponding producers to exaggerate production case, producer net income will be increased by data, rather than accurately report production or respondents' over-reporting, rather than underto have no forecast at all. However, for the reporting, production as is sometimes suggested. Finally, the inability of producers accurately to anticipate equilibrium price and output during Qe> l p-Qel
The amount of production adjustment that is socially desirable depends on the magnitude of planting intentions reports would likely IQp -Qe , which is determined by the maghave much higher social value than would nitude of P* -Pe . The amount of production a report on estimated crop size late in the adjustment that actually takes place (i.e., Qpgrowing season. Qr) depends on the slope of aa and the range over which aa is defined; that is, the magnitude of (Qu FOOD FOR THOUGHT -QL at the time the forecast is released ( Figure  1) . Therefore, the potential social benefits to be As is often the case when we explore new congenerated by a USDA production forecast decepts, our analysis raises as many questions as it pend on (Qp -Qe) and (Qu -QL), not on the answers. For example, we have suggested that magnitude of the USDA forecast error. producer forecast error P * -Pe is a much These observations make it possible to draw more important source of resource misallocation some tentative conclusions about decision in agriculture than is the magnitude of the USDA criteria to be used by USDA program adminisproduction forecast error Q -Qe . Therefore, trators contemplating changes in the production it appears that, perhaps, we should focus considforecasting system. 3 The decision criteria listed erable effort on helping producers reduce the below are expressed in terms of decisions remagnitude of I P * -Pe . Moreover, we have quired by budget restrictions. However, the consuggested that if a USDA production forecast is verse would apply if the decision maker were to be eliminated, then eliminate the report for dealing with an expanded budget.
which the expected value of I Qp -Qe is lowest. (1) If a production forecast must be eliminated But how do we identify Pe and Qe? Can we define for either commodity X or commodity Y, market equilibrium in an empirically meaningful then eliminate the report on the commodity way? Is the P* on which producers base their for which historical evidence suggests that production plans their estimate of Pe? Should it the expected value of (Qp -Qe) is the lowbe? If Pe and Qe define the socially optimal level est, ceteris paribus. of output, perhaps we should provide estimates (2) Since the social value of USDA production of Pe and Qe, along with our estimates of planned forecasts is not totally dependent on the production and the resulting price. How do food accuracy of the forecasts, reduced accuand agriculture policies affect farmers' percepracy of reports on both commodities will tions of Pe? What is the appropriate use of Pe in likely be preferable to elimination of either policy development and administration? What report.
are the dynamic implications for Pe following a (3) Whether eliminating a particular report or severe shock to agricultural markets? accepting reduced accuracy, the resource Numerous questions remain unanswered. reductions should be focused on reports These questions provide an opportunity for rethat are released late, rather than early, in search that could provide exceptionally high rethe production process. For example, turns in the future.
